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Abstract 
This paper considers for the first time whether there is school-type homogamy, and 
whether for women there are significant advantages from private schooling as a 
consequence of school-type homogamy. Its focus is Britain, where a private education 
is associated with substantial labour market advantages and where access is socially 
exclusive. We find that privately educated women are 7 percentage points more likely 
than observably similar state-educated women to marry privately educated men. 
Privately educated married women have husbands who earn 15% higher pay, according 
to the BHPS-UKHLS panel (20% at age 42, according to the British Cohort Study). 
Causation is not established and considerable caution would be needed if interpreting 
these associations as reflecting causal effects from private schools. The findings 
nevertheless raise anew the issue of the negative association between Britain’s private 
schooling and social mobility. 
Keywords 
Private school; pay; social mobility; homogamy; marriage 
Introduction 
Historically, education in Britain for affluent 
families' girls in private schools focused on domestic 
economy and "accomplishments", rather than 
intellectual pursuits, in a socially segregated setting, 
ready for a suitable marriage within their class 
(Gathorne-Hardy, 1977). In the last part of the 19th 
century a number of pioneering schools emerged 
with a more academic curriculum, forerunners of a 
convergence between the orientations of boys and 
girls schools in the last half-century, as women 
raised their labour force participation. 
Nevertheless, the idea that a private education 
might be a springboard (intended or not) for 
securing marriage to a high-earnings husband 
retains its place in some public discourse even in 
modern times.1 This expectation draws some 
credence from the extensive evidence of 
homogamy by education and by social class in 
modern societies (see the review by Schwartz, 
2013). Homogamy within social class is, of course, 
nothing new. The last half-century, however, has 
seen a transformation in the importance of 
education for economic and social success (Goldin 
& Katz, 2008). Since in Britain the dividing line 
between state and private education is especially 
sharp, it can be suggested that homogamy 
associated with education level would additionally 
take the form of homogamy associated with school-
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type (interpreted here as private or state). Yet 
hitherto no studies have investigated whether 
privately educated people are disproportionately 
likely to marry others who are privately educated, 
or whether there is any return to private schooling 
via marriage. 
This paper examines whether there is 
homogamy within school-type in England, and 
whether for women there are significant returns to 
private schooling through marriage. Private 
education is associated with substantial labour 
market advantages in Britain, including greater 
access to high-status and influential jobs and a large 
pay premium (Dearden, Ferri, & Meghir, 2002; 
Green, Machin, Murphy, & Zhu, 2012; McKnight, 
2015; Green, Henseke, & Vignoles, 2017; Green, 
Parsons, Sullivan, & Wiggins, 2018). Unsurprisingly, 
the schools' pupil populations are drawn from high-
income families, in many of which one or both 
parents have themselves been privately educated 
(Dearden, Ryan & Sibieta, 2011; Green, Anders, 
Henderson, & Henseke 2017). The high labour 
market returns and the exclusivity together lead, it 
is held, to a constraint on social mobility and a 
buttress for high levels of inequality in Britain. Any 
additional return to private schooling via marriage 
to a higher-earning spouse would enhance such 
effects, while at the same time altering the calculus 
of parents' school choice. 
The institutional separation between the private 
and state sectors is marked by a distinct and looser 
form of regulation in the private sector. British 
private schools can admit whomever they choose, 
charge whatever fees they like, determine their 
own budgets within market constraints, and 
manage and govern independently. They are 
subject only to their own voluntary regulatory body 
and, more pertinently, the pressures of the public 
national examination system. While many are 
engaged in minor relationships (such as the sharing 
of facilities) with neighbourhood state schools, their 
relationships are mainly with other private schools. 
The private schools have their own sectoral 
institutions (at the pinnacle of which is the 
Independent Schools Council). Unlike in the 
majority of other country's private sectors, Britain's 
private schools now receive virtually no direct 
public subsidies. There used to be some subsidy 
through the Assisted Places Scheme that ran from 
1981 till 1997 (Power, Whitty, & Wisby, 2006), and 
historically local government would subsidise 
boarding school places in private schools for 
children in special circumstances. But such 
injections of funding have been virtually absent in 
the 21st century.2 The private schools do benefit, 
however, from some tax concessions, which, for 
example, lower their local business taxes by 80%; 
however, these subsidies are relatively minor, 
amounting to only a few percent of their turnover. 
There are 82% of private schools with the status of 
charities, which among other advantages allows 
them to accept donations favourably; 16% are for-
profit institutions.  
This absence of substantive government funding 
is one reason why the private cost is especially high 
– in 2017 the average annual fee before any extras
was £13,818 for day school and £32,259 for
boarding school. Since the 1980s the schools have
continuously elevated the fees in a competition
over facilities and small class sizes. The 2017 fees
were approximately three times the 1980 fees in
real terms, and the teacher-pupil ratio has become
twice as high in the private sector as in the state
sector. To compete with state education, private
schools in Britain have increased their emphasis on
academic and cultural achievements (Turner, 2015;
Peel, 2015;), not least so their pupils could gain
access to high-ranked universities (Boliver, 2013).
The private school sector in Britain arrived, at the
start of this century, in good financial and academic
health, still largely serving the increasingly affluent
professional and managerial classes. The proportion
of school children in private school has remained
relatively steady, at between 6 and 7% for both
sexes since the 1980s, despite the fee rises.
Moreover, participation increases with age, up to
approximately 17% at upper secondary level, which
occurs in part because many state school pupils
have left school at 16 (even though they may stay in
education). There is a disproportionate
concentration of private schools in the South East
and in London. About one in four schools take
boarders, and one in five are single sex, unlike in
the state sector where single-sex education is rare
(2% of schools) and boarding even rarer (less than
1%). With few exceptions, the elite sector of
schooling is in the private sector, and the privately
educated, in addition to enjoying the earnings
premiums noted above, which they receive as a
result of their high education levels and post-
education labour market advantages, continue to
dominate public life in Britain with vastly
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disproportionate representation in influential 
positions (Kirby, 2016).  
In this context, it is important to understand 
better the links between private schooling and 
marriage outcomes in the modern era. The 
argument we develop below may be concisely 
stated as follows. Private schooling for women may 
lead to an economic return via the marriage market 
in two ways. First, owing to the high quality of 
private schooling in Britain, combined with 
educational homogamy, privately schooled women 
are more likely to marry a well-educated husband 
who in turn will therefore have a better job and 
higher earnings. Second, we hypothesise that there 
is also a tendency for ‘school-type homogamy’, in 
which privately-educated women are more likely 
(than with a random draw) to marry privately 
educated men; since privately educated men earn a 
premium beyond their education premium in 
Britain’s labour market, this also yields a gain for 
the women who marry them. 
While much of the argument would apply also to 
men, our focus here is on the marriage returns from 
private schooling for women, as manifested in their 
husband's labour market outcomes. We do this in 
part to reflect the historical role of girls' education, 
noted above, as a path to a good marriage rather 
than academic achievement. In addition, the own-
wage returns to education, to private schooling and 
to marriage are all known to be gender specific (e.g. 
Silles, 2007; Green et al., 2012; Antonovics & Town, 
2004).  
To examine these marriage market returns from 
private schooling for females, we required suitable 
longitudinal data covering both partners. 
Accordingly, we use the British Household Panel 
Study combined with its successor the UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (BHPS-UKHLS); we 
also use data drawn from the 2012 wave of the 
longitudinal British Cohort Study when all cohort 
members were aged 42. After setting out our 
theoretical expectations in detail in the next 
section, we follow with a description of the data. 
The subsequent section presents findings 
concerning school-type homogamy. We investigate 
whether there is, as expected, an above-random 
chance that the husbands of privately educated 
women had also been privately educated, even 
after controlling for the women’s social 
background. In Results, we investigate the 
association between women’s private schooling and 
their husband's earnings, followed by our 
conclusions. 
School-type homogamy and the 
marriage market return to private 
education 
In this section, we outline how school-type 
homogamy might arise in Britain, partly as a by-
product of the well-known phenomenon of 
homogamy by education level. This argument then 
paves the way for an analysis of the benefits of a 
private education for women, in terms of the 
earnings of future marriage partners. 
The tendency for people to marry or partner 
with others of similar educational status is well 
established (Elder Jr, 1969; Uunk, Ganzeboom & 
Róbert, 1996; Blackwell, 1998; Kalmijn, 1998; 
Reynolds, Baker & Pedersen, 2000; Blossfeld & 
Timm, 2003; Schwartz & Mare, 2005; Schwartz, 
2013; Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov & Santos, 
2014) and has been implicated in growing resource 
inequalities between households (Blossfeld & 
Buchholz, 2009). Homogamy is argued to result 
from matched preferences, and from competition 
in the marriage market for spouses with valuable 
traits. Blossfeld (2009) adds that the education 
system acts as a marriage market, with expanding 
post-school education providing contact 
opportunities for equally educated men and women 
at a transitional time when partner search is often 
high. Educational homogamy contributes 
significantly to both economic inequality and low 
inter-generational social mobility in Britain 
(Ermisch, Francesconi & Siedler, 2006). The trends 
in educational homogamy across countries are 
mixed (Blossfeld, 2009). There is evidence that 
educational homogamy declined in Britain between 
1973 and 1986/7, but rebounded upwards between 
1986/7 and 1994/5 (Halpin & Chan, 2003). In the 
United States, by contrast, there is a lack of 
consensus as to whether educational homogamy 
has risen or remained stable (Siow, 2015; Gihleb & 
Lang, 2016, though any change seems not, in itself, 
to have had a large effect on inequality (Schwartz, 
2013; Breen & Andersen, 2012; Greenwood et al., 
2014). Increases have been attributed to the 
changing socio-demographic composition of the 
population, changes in marriage rates, and more 
generally to a societal modernisation trend 
whereby achieved characteristics have become 
more important, relative to social and ethnic 
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background, for partner selection; rising inequality 
is another factor.  
Educational homogamy has implications for 
matching in terms of school type, because private 
schooling in Britain yields a substantial return in 
terms of educational achievement. Studies have 
shown that private schooling delivers (on average) 
superior performance in nationally validated exams, 
and in access to universities, especially high-ranking 
universities which select on academic achievement 
(Dearden et al., 2002; Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2011; 
Gregg & Macmillan, 2010; Goodman, Gregg & 
Washbrook, 2011; Crawford, Goodman & Joyce, 
2010; Jerrim, Parker, Chmielewski & Anders, 2015; 
Sullivan, Parsons, Wiggins, Heath & Green, 2014).3 A 
consequence of this private schools’ quality 
advantage is that educational homogamy is 
expected to be partially reflected in ‘school-type 
homogamy’: an above-random tendency for 
privately educated women to marry privately 
education men.  
We also conjecture that school-type homogamy 
may arise directly, as a consequence of the shared 
values and social networks inculcated through 
private education, and from the spatial and social 
clustering of the privately educated. These factors 
can apply at multiple stages – at school and 
thereafter in universities, workplaces or other social 
networks. 
British private secondary schools were 
traditionally single-sex, and the development of 
long-lasting romantic relationships was accordingly 
limited during school years. Nevertheless, even 
though many girls’ schools came to fully embrace 
academic learning objectives, these schools were 
often largely concerned with preparing girls for an 
advantageous marriage (Gathorne-Hardy, 1977; 
Blandford, 1977). By the 1980s, the majority of the 
(traditionally elite, male) HMC (Headmasters’ 
Conference) private schools admitted girls as well 
as boys (Walford, 1983). This change was motivated 
largely by economic pressures on the private 
schools, but Walford also cites views that girls 
would act as a civilising influence, and help the boys 
to learn how to interact with the opposite sex. 
There is only small-scale qualitative evidence for 
relationship development within or among private 
schools and its link to the reproduction of privileged 
status (Maxwell & Aggleton, 2014a, 2014b). For 
those who do not pursue their education further, 
post-school networks through family and work are 
likely to be disproportionately within school type, 
owing to shared values and friendship networks 
developed within and surrounding the schools 
(Ashley, Duberley, Sommerlad & Scholarios, 2015; 
Cookson & Persell, 1985).  
For those who proceed to university, however, it 
could be expected that social networks broaden 
beyond the cultural range of potential partners 
encountered by the privately educated in their 
school days. Most of the higher-educated adult 
population in Britain have been to university at a 
time when no or low fees were payable, and many 
would have been in receipt of maintenance grants. 
Thus universities have been substantially more 
socially inclusive than private schools, and we 
would expect that school-type homogamy would be 
less frequent among those who proceed to 
university after school than among those who do 
not go to university. Nevertheless, a much higher 
proportion of private school leavers than of state 
school leavers go to university, and these privately 
educated students are concentrated in high-ranking 
universities (Boliver, 2013). The concentration is yet 
greater in certain subjects (arts and humanities), 
which is notable given recent Europe-wide evidence 
of field-of-study assortative mating (Bičáková & 
Jurajda, 2016). This spatial and disciplinary 
concentration of privately-educated people at a 
time of life when a notable part of mate selection 
takes place could therefore limit the extent to 
which going to college diminishes the probability of 
intra school-type mating.  
While university is an important site of mate 
selection, selection and marriage also occur later in 
the context of work or other domains. Yet since 
private schooling also promotes access to scarce 
good jobs, and since value-sharing is thought to 
contribute to that advantage (Ashley et al., 2015), 
the social and spatial proximity of like-for-like 
school types can continue after the end of full-time 
education.  
Our hypothesis, therefore, is that school-type 
homogamy arises both indirectly as the by-product 
of educational homogamy and private school 
educational quality, and directly since private 
schooling augments the extent to which values and 
social networks are shared. Formally, we conceive 
the high educational quality of private schooling for 
either females or males in the form of a latent 
quality index, *iτ  which positively affects the 
quality of schooling of either wife or husband 
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(i=w,h) and hence the achieved education level (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖), 
according to a standard educational production 






 with x a vector of 
all other factors affecting educational achievement. 
Here, for ease of exposition, we treat 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as a 
continuous indicator, though this is operationalised 
conventionally below as discrete education levels, 
and we later operationalise *iτ  with a dummy 
indicator for private schooling. Then, the hypothesis 
can be expressed in terms of the relationship 
between the husband’s and wife’s school qualities 
resulting from the marriage match, with both an 






















Here, α is capturing the extent to which 
educational homogamy is reflected earlier in the 
school-type (because of private school quality), 
while )(Sβ > 0 is a parameter capturing the extent 
to which a rise in school quality of the wife is 
directly associated, as a consequence of shared 
values and networks, with an increased school 
quality of the husband. As suggested above, social 
networks will be broadened for those who attend 
university, despite some degree of private school 
concentration within universities; hence we expect 
that 0/ <β . 
In the light of this hypothesis of school-type 
homogamy, there are two arguments as to why 
there could be a premium for women in Britain 
from private schooling, manifested in the earnings 
of their husbands. First, their private schooling 
delivers higher educational achievement, which as a 
result of educational homogamy implies that their 
husbands have higher educational achievement 
than those of state-educated women, which yield 
them higher wages. Second, with school-type 
homogamy their husbands are more likely to be 
privately educated, and this yields an additional 
boost to their earnings. Studies variously reveal a 
large pay premium for private schooling in Britain, 
or a substantially greater chance of being in the top 
earnings decile, or of attending a high-status 
occupation, or of avoiding downward social mobility 
(Dolton & Vignoles, 2000; Naylor, Smith & 
McKnight, 2002; Dearden et al., 2002; Crawford & 
Vignoles, 2014; Macmillan, Tyler & Vignoles, 2015; 
Crawford & van der Erve, 2015; Green et al., 2012; 
Green et al., 2017a; Green et al., 2018). For women, 
much or all of this return is accounted for by their 
educational attainment, but for men there remains 
a direct pay premium, over and above that which 
can be explained by their educational credentials.  
Formally we assume, as is conventional, that 
men will participate in the labour force and will 
receive an income (𝑌𝑌ℎ) according to a human 
capital earnings function, commensurate with their 
education achievement and private schooling:  
0),( * >= hhh SgY τ  with 0,0 * >> hgg hS τ (2) 
Combining this human capital earnings function 
with the hypothesised school-type homogamy (1), 
along with education level homogamy and the 
quality of private education, it is thus hypothesised 
that a woman's private education will be associated 
with having a more-educated, more likely privately-
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This expression shows that a positive return to 
marriage for women's private education decision, in 
the form of the husband's income, stems from two 
elements. One element derives from a combination 
of the woman's educational benefits from the 
private schooling ( *
w
f







∂ ) and the earnings benefits 
of that extra education (
hS
g ). The second element 




τ ) in combination with school-type homogamy,







∂ ). Without any direct pay 
premium for men’s private schooling, the benefit 
would be purely a by-product of the education level 
homogamy. 
Consistent with the hypothesis of school-type 
positive homogamy, Evans and Tilley (2011) report, 
using the British Social Attitudes Survey, that 
privately educated people are more likely to marry 
other privately educated people. Similarly, Power, 
Sims and Whitty (2013) mention that among those 
who had gone through the Assisted Places Scheme 
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– a government-funded programme (1981–1997)
for low-income pupils to attend private secondary
schools – one in four of those cohabiting had
privately-educated partners. Yet beyond these
simple descriptive findings, there have been no
studies, to our knowledge, of school-type
homogamy as a sub-category of education
homogamy, either in Britain or in any other country
that resembles Britain through having relatively
exclusive private schooling alongside a state
system. In the context of the especially elite private
school system in Britain, this represents an
important gap in our understanding of the value of
a private school investment and of the origins of
low social mobility.
Nor have any studies, to our knowledge, 
examined the association between school-type and 
returns through marriage. However, two tangential 
studies focusing on university type are relevant to 
note at this point, each from countries that have an 
elite private education sector, namely Chile and the 
US. Kaufmann, Messner and Solis (2015) report that 
going to a higher-ranking university in Chile in the 
early 2000s meant that women were likely to marry 
someone who had scored more highly on the 
university admissions test. Meanwhile, Arum, Roksa 
and Budig (2008) report that, for a cohort of older 
graduates in the United States, going to a more elite 
university had raised the probability of marrying 
socially privileged spouses. For women, the pay-off 
was to marry husbands with higher income.  
Our main aim is thus to investigate two 
hypotheses: 
H1: There is predicted to be homogamy by 
school-type in Britain. We expect to find this, both 
with the raw data on school type and after 
conditioning on women’s education and social 
background. If confirmed, does the homogamy 
diminish in magnitude, as predicted, among those 
with a university-level education? 
H2: For married women, there is predicted to be 
an association between whether they have 
attended private schooling and their husbands’ 
earnings.  
Data 
To address these questions, we required British 
data on households, covering both marriage 
partners’ earnings and school-types, educational 
achievement data, and adequate controls for social 
background. Accordingly we combined data from 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
Understanding Society (the UK Household 
Longitudinal Study: UKHLS). BHPS was an annual 
panel study of each adult member of a 
representative sample of households in the UK 
between 1991 and 2008. UKHLS, from its second 
wave on, incorporated the BHPS sample, thus 
enabling us to track the original BHPS sample 
members and their current circumstances up until 
the latest UKHLS wave.4  
In line with the majority of papers examining 
homogamy, our primary focus is on married, rather 
than cohabiting couples. This decision is motivated 
by indications that cohabiting but unmarried 
matches are much less durable (though some are a 
prelude to marriage) (Ermisch & Francesconi, 2000) 
and do not always involve full income-sharing 
between partners (Winkler, 1997; Hiekel, Liefbroer, 
& Poortman, 2014). Nevertheless, we test whether 
our findings are sensitive to this choice. 
By selecting observations from women who 
were between 24 and 59 years old and their 
husbands, our sample is restricted to women below 
normal retirement age, almost all of whom had 
finished their initial cycle of full-time education. 
This leaves us with an unbalanced panel of 
approximately 72,000 person-year observations of 
8,167 women, of which close to 43,000 
observations were within marriages spanning the 
whole of Britain from 1991 to 2013. Respondents 
were asked once, when they joined the survey (or, 
in the case of the children in the households of 
panel members, when they were rising 16), to 'look 
at this card and tell me what type of school (you are 
attending/you attended last)’. We coded a binary 
0/1 indicator variable to distinguish state-educated 
and privately-educated respondents according to 
whether they had last attended a private (that is, 
fee-paying) school; 6% stated that they had 
attended private school. This indicator is less than 
perfect, in that it does not capture the number of 
years that the panel members may have spent at 
private school; nevertheless, the last school 
attended should still be relevant for capturing 
school-type associations with values, networks, 
post-school activities and partner-selection.  
For the analyses of husband’s earnings, we also 
show findings derived from the age 42 wave of the 
British Cohort Study (BCS), a survey of people born 
in Britain in a single week in 1970 (Elliott & 
Shepherd, 2006). On one hand these additional 
findings provide a robustness check on the broad 
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conclusions from the BHPS-UKHLS analyses, albeit 
using weekly, rather than hourly, pay. On the other 
hand the BCS contains high-quality, rich social 
background data derived from the childhood waves 
(at birth and at ages 5, 10 and 16), which enable us 
to control for an especially rich set of potentially 
confounding variables. We include, first, indicators 
of socio-economic background during childhood: 
parent’s social class at cohort member’s birth 
(highest of father or mother), parents’ highest 
education level when the child was age 5, housing 
tenure type (at age 5), persons per room ratio (at 
age 5), number of days read to in a reference week 
at age 5 (a measure of cultural capital), mother’s 
age at birth, receipt of free school meals at school 
at age 10 (a commonly used indicator of social 
deprivation) and banded family income at age 10. 
Second, we control for cohort members’ early 
cognitive developments using indicators collected 
at ages 5 and 10 (Parsons, 2014). Third, we control 
for three personal characteristics typically 
associated with later development: birth order, 
weight at birth, and whether ever breast-fed. 
Finally, we include two standard demographic 
controls: ethnicity, and current region of residence.5 
The BCS school-type indicator we use is private 
school attendance at age 16. For this we used 
information from the 1986 Head Teacher’s 
Questionnaire, but where this variable was missing 
we used the 1986 Schools Census; where 
information from 1986 was unavailable, we 
deployed an indicator derived from a retrospective 
question in the age 42 survey.6 We excluded those 
from Special Needs schools (whether private or 
state). In BHPS-UKLHS the participation indicator is, 
for most respondents, a retrospective measure.  
There are, however, issues of attrition and item 
non-response that needed addressing.7 The age 16 
survey wave remains broadly representative for 
important demographic characteristics (gender, 
parents’ ages of leaving full-time education, 
biological parenthood, ethnicity and country) 
(Mostafa & Wiggins, 2015). Nevertheless, to avoid a 
substantive loss of information and 
representativeness that would arise by looking only 
at cases with full information on all waves, 
following (Schafer, 1997; Little & Rubin, 2002; 
Carpenter & Kenward, 2013) we applied multiple 
imputation to handle any item missingness for 
those cases with complete observations on 
husband’s earnings and school type. 
Further variable details and descriptive statistics 
from both data sets are given in the appendix. 
School-type homogamy 
We first investigate school type homogamy, 
beginning with a simple description of marriage 
frequencies and partners’ school-type, using BHPS-
UKHLS – see table 1. Among those that were 
married, there is strong indicative evidence for 
school type homogamy: while 13% of privately 
educated women were married to privately 
educated husbands, this was the case for only 3% of 
state school educated women. 
One way to summarise the presence of 
homogamy is the local log odds ratio that compares 
the frequency of people in homogamous couples to 
that of people in non-homogamous couples (for 
each pair of school types) (Siow, 2015). Let 𝜇𝜇𝜏𝜏𝑤𝑤 ,𝜏𝜏ℎ
be the absolute frequency of marriage between 
women of school type 𝜏𝜏𝑤𝑤 ∈ [0,1] with men of 
school type 𝜏𝜏ℎ. If there is positive homogamy, the 
index m = ln ��𝜇𝜇1,1 ⋅ 𝜇𝜇0,0 ��𝜇𝜇0,1 ⋅ 𝜇𝜇1,0 �−1� will be
positive. This metric has been interpreted as the 
‘force of attraction’ (Bičáková & Jurajda, 2016) and 
is related to the ‘surplus’ from marriage in  
Table 1: Marital status and partner’s school type by women’s school type. 




Not married Married 
Partner's School Type 
Private State 
Private 33.9 13.3 52.9 
State 37.9 3.1 59.0 
Total 37.7 3.7 58.6 
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economics studies of partner choice (Choo & Siow, 
2006; Menzel, 2015). With our data we find that m 
= 1.58 for school-type homogamy, and significantly 
above zero (p=0.000). This index compares with a 
value of m = 2.32 for homogamy by education-level 
(graduate/non-graduate).  
Since private schooling is socially exclusive, given 
its high price for most pupils, school-type 
homogamy is likely to reflect, in part, the social 
closure brought about by social background. To 
what extent, then, is the school-type of the 
husband associated with a woman’s private school 
attendance per se, after controlling for her social 
class background, as implied by the hypothesis of 
equation (2)? To examine this question, we restrict 
our attention to married women and estimate four 
probit models, the results of which are summarised 
in table 2.8 In each the private school dummy is 
interacted with age groups, to allow for different 
effects at varying life course stages, and the table 
presents the average marginal effects of private 
school attendance on the probability of being 
married to a privately educated husband.  
In the first column, only age group and ethnicity 
are controlled for, and the estimated coefficient 
approximately restates what was revealed in the 
descriptive table above, showing a large tendency 
for school-type homogamy. There is a 14 
percentage point higher chance of being married to 
a private-school-educated husband for a woman 
who is privately educated than for a woman who is 
state educated.  
In column 2, we also include as controls the 
women’s social background. Compared with column 
(1) the estimated degree of school-type homogamy
is substantially reduced by about a half. As
expected, part of the preference for private school
educated spouses can be attributed to the social
background that usually determines private school
participation. Yet even after accounting for social
background, attending private school still raises the
probability of being married to a privately educated
husband by 7 percentage points. This is our best
estimate describing school-type positive homogamy
among observably similar women. However, we
caution that, if interpreted as a causal effect, it
could be biased if there are elements in the
individuals’ background not captured by parental
social class and parental education, which affect
both choice of school type and the likelihood of 
partnering with a privately-educated husband.  
The hypothesis of equation (1) is that school-
type homogamy potentially derives from two 
elements, one being a by-product of education-
level homogamy, the other being an additional 
direct element. The education-level element here is 
binary: whether or not the women obtained higher 
education. To what extent, then, is the homogamy 
just a reflection of achieving higher education? 
Column (3) adds to the model a dummy for 
women's attainment of higher education. As can be 
seen, while higher education in itself increases the 
chances of being married to a privately educated 
husband, private-school-educated women were still 
6 percentage points more likely to be married to a 
man of the same school type. Thus the school-type 
homogamy cannot be explained by the woman's 
educational level and social background. We take 
this as indicative of a positive average value for β , 
reflecting the direct element of the tendency for 
school-type homogamy. 
But is this direct element less strong, as 
expected, among those who do go on to higher 
education, than among those who leave education 
at the secondary stage? Column (4) introduces an 
interaction term between higher education and 
private schooling. Among those who do not 
proceed to higher education, the chances of being 
married to a privately educated husband are 11 
percentage points higher for privately educated 
women, as compared with state-educated women. 
Among those who do proceed to higher education, 
however, the chances are not significantly 
associated with private school status. Thus, while 
educational homogamy is a route through which 
school-type homogamy takes place (private schools 
raise entry to higher education, which itself raises 
the probability of school-type homogamy), 
nevertheless within that higher level of education 
school-type homogamy is attenuated, as expected, 
reflecting the wider social and cultural environment 
of university life and beyond. In this sense, the 
experience of higher education involves a reduction 
of social boundaries.  
Females’ private schooling and their 
husband’s earnings 
Given that there is education-level homogamy, 
that private schools in Britain are of high quality as  
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measured by their pupils' educational 
achievements, and that in addition there is school-
type homogamy in Britain, do privately-educated 
married women benefit from a premium on their 
husbands’ earnings over those of state-educated 
women, as hypothesised in equation (4)?  
From this point on, we are able to address our 
key questions using both sets of data. Using BHPS-
UKHLS, table 3a shows the descriptive pattern of 
husbands’ real gross monthly earnings, according to 
the school-types of each partner. As shown in the 
final column, women’s private school attendance is 
associated with higher-earning husbands. The 
spouse of the average state-educated married 
women earned around £2,794 per month compared 
to £3,686 among women who attended private 
school – a raw premium of 32%. It is also of note 
that, among married women who attended private 
school, those in homogamous unions had on 
average husbands with the greatest gross monthly 
labour income (£3,834). Using BCS, table 3b shows 
that, at age 42, the raw weekly husband’s earnings 
gap by school type was substantially higher at 62%. 
Table 2: School-Type Homogamy: Probably of marriage to a privately educated spouse 
Pooled BHPS-UKHLS 1991-2015. Average marginal effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4)


















Demographics (R) X X X X 
Social Background (R) X X X 
N 42,957 42,957 42,957 42,957 
Notes: Pooled probit estimator using the cross-sectional survey weights with robust standard errors in the unbalanced panel of 
married women aged 24–59 years. Dependent variable is 1 if partner has attended a private secondary school and zero otherwise. 
All models include a set of period dummies and a London dummy to account for differences across time and regions. Demographics 
comprise age-groups and ethnicity; social background is captured by highest parental socio-economic group and level of educational 
attainment. Women’s highest level of educational achievement is captured by an indicator for higher tertiary educational 
attainment. Private school effect averaged over age-groups. Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
Table 3a: Husbands’ real gross monthly earnings among married women in GBP (CPI 2015=100) 




Partner’s school type 
Private State Mean 
Private 3,833.85 3,621.02 3,685.52 
State 3,314.53 2,763.44 2,794.19 
Mean 3,408.26 2,806.07 2,844.68 
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Table 3b: Husbands’ weekly earnings among married women in GBP 








We address the questions formally in tables 4a 
and 4b. Our basic estimating model operationalises 
equation (3) by treating private school status as a 






wh ZaaaY εφτ +++= ∑210 , with 0)( =hE ε  (4) 
The lwZ  are observables capturing demographic 
characteristics (age, ethnicity, region), social class 
background, prior cognitive skills (BCS only), and 
birth characteristics (BCS only), which could be 
correlated with husbands’ labour market outcomes 
as well as with women’s own school-type, as 
described above. The first model (in both 4a and 
4b) gives the estimates for 1a  with just the
demographic characteristics included. Then the 
second model shows our core estimates of equation 
(4), including the whole range of other controls, 
giving the associations of husbands’ earnings with 
women’s school-type for observably similar women. 
We also include a third model that adds in 
indicators of the husband’s social class, school type 
and education achievement, in order to see 
whether the private school premium we are 
investigating can be crudely accounted for by those 
characteristics. 
To investigate outcomes other than just the 
mean linear effect on hourly earnings, we also 
investigate whether there are associations with 
husbands' earnings being in the top decile of the 
distribution, as well as the opposite association with 
husbands' earnings being in the bottom half of the 
distribution (thereby helping to protect against 
downward social mobility). We also examine the 
association of women’s private education with their 
husband’s attainment of a high occupation status (a 
professional or managerial job).  
Estimator choice depends on the scale of the 
dependent variable and follows standard practices. 
For binary outcomes we employ a probit estimator. 
In all models shown, the tables report average 
marginal effects (AME). Since private school 
attendance is a time-constant individual 
characteristic in BHPS-UKHLS, we rely on cross-
sectional estimators. To account for the repeated 
observations within individuals over time in the 
panel, potential heteroscedasticity, and changes in 
composition due to sample attrition, we use the 
supplied cross-section survey weights and a robust 
variance-covariance matrix in the estimations. With 
the BCS data, given that multiple imputation has 
been used for some variables, as recommended by 
Carpenter and Kenward (2013) we present 
estimates derived from 20 alternative imputation 
outcomes, using the Stata multiple estimation 
routines, with robust standard errors. 
In this set-up there are inevitable limitations and 
caveats that would have to be borne in mind if the 
estimates were to be interpreted as implying causal 
effects of private schooling and if they were to be 
used to compute women’s choice-relevant 
investment returns from private schooling via 
marriage. The main complication arises from the 
two-sided nature of the matching processes. In our 
data, we are able to observe neither all the feasible 
matching alternatives nor all the relevant factors 
that might inform the marriage decision. Thus 
unobservables on both sides may confound the 
estimates if they are related to the participation in 
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private secondary education. We return to these 
caveats in the concluding discussion below. 
Column (1) shows a substantial association with 
husbands’ outcomes after controlling just for 
demographic characteristics. Married women who 
had attended private schools were matched with 
men who were considerably more successful in the 
labour market than the husbands of state-school 
educated women. In the case of the BHPS-UKHLS 
data, the husbands of these women received on 
average 26.0% (=exp(0.231)-1) higher hourly 
earnings. In the case of the BCS, the privately 
educated age-42 cohort members' husbands 
received 37.9% (=exp(0.327)-1) higher weekly 
earnings. With both data sets, the husbands of the 
privately educated women were significantly more 
likely to be in the top (>=90%) earnings decile, more 
likely to work in high status, managerial or 
professional occupations, and less likely to earn 
incomes below the median.  
Some of these effects may be attributable in 
part to respondents’ social background. Private-
school-educated women are more likely to come 
from well-off families (Dearden et al., 2011), 
increasing the opportunity to access marriage 
networks of potential high earners. Hence we 
condition on respondents’ social background, to 
give the estimates from equation (5). While the 
controls reduce the estimates substantially – see 
the average marginal effects in column (2) 
compared with those in column (1) – the remaining 
effects are still quantitatively significant. The 
conditional husbands’ pay premium is 15% for 
hourly earnings in the BHPS-UKHLS, and 20% in BCS.  
Similarly, the husbands of privately educated 
women remained more likely to be situated in the 
top earnings decile and to work in high-status 
occupations. Spouses of privately educated women 
were 10 percentage points more likely to be in the 
top pay decile as the husbands of state-educated 
women (8 points for BCS at age 42), and again 10 
percentage points more likely to work in a high-
status occupation (BHPS-UKHLS) though this effect 
is insignificant in the BCS data. In the BCS data (but 
not with the BHPS-UKHLS) there is also a weakly 
statistically significant protective effect of private 
school attendance against below-median earnings 
husbands, lowering that probability by 8 percentage 
points.  
Column (3) in each table adds controls for 
husband’s characteristics and respondent’s post-
secondary educational attainment (graduate/non-
graduate). These reduce the average marginal 
effects considerably and in some cases the effect is 
not statistically significant, indicating that these 
characteristics mediate much of the association 
with husbands' outcomes. However, in two cases 
(top earnings for the BHPS data, log earnings for the 
BCS) the association remains weakly statistically 
significant. In these cases the estimates imply that 
private-educated women are matched with 
partners that earn more than their observed 
characteristics suggest on average. We conclude 
there are some unobserved husband characteristics 
associated both with their pay and with their wives’ 
school type; in the case of the BCS this could 
include the husband's school-type which is 
unobserved. 
So far our sample has excluded cohabiting but 
unmarried couples from the analyses. We do not 
have information about intra-household resource 
sharing in our data sets, but it could be expected 
that resources are shared at least partially among a 
substantial proportion of cohabiting, unmarried 
couples. For these, similar arguments about school-
type homogamy and education-level homogamy 
apply. We therefore re-ran our analyses including 
all cohabiting couples, whether married or not. We 
found the same pattern of results with only small 
changes in the estimated coefficients. As a further 
test of robustness, we took account of differences 
within the state sector of education, distinguishing 
between grammar schools, which are academically 
selective schools available in a minority of regions 
of Britain, and all other state schools that are not 
permitted to select on academic merit. Including a 
separate dummy variable for grammar school 
attendance made only small differences to the 
estimated associations of private school attendance 
with subsequent marriage to a privately educated 
man, and with the husbands' labour market 
outcomes. Since a few women at the age of 24 may 
still have been in full-time education such as in 
postgraduate research programmes, we also run a 
robustness check with a BHPS/UKHLS sample 
limited to the age bracket 30–59 years. This has no 
effect on the estimated patterns.9
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Table 4a: Husbands’ labour market outcomes, pooled BHPS/UKHLS 1991–2015 
(1) (2) (3) 
(I) Log real hourly pay (log points)






N 28,660 28,660 28,660 
(II) Real hourly earnings in 90% decile of distribution (AME)






N 28,961 28,961 28,961 
(III) Real hourly earnings in the bottom half of distribution (AME)






N 28,961 28,961 28,961 
(IV) High Status Occupation (AME)






N 35,209 35,209 35,209 
Demographics (R) X X X 
Social Background (R) X X 





Notes: Pooled estimations using cross-sectional survey weights and a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust variance-
covariance matrix. Unbalanced panel of married women aged 24–59 years. Dependent variables: (I) husbands’ usual log real gross 
hourly earnings; (II) dummy if husbands’ real gross hourly earnings were in 90% decile; (III) dummy if husbands’ real hourly earnings 
were below the grand median of the hourly earnings distribution; (IV) dummy if husband holds a high status occupation (SOC1990 or 
SOC2000, major groups 1&2). Including a set of period dummies for survey period and region of residence. For social background 
and education, see notes to table 2. Model 3 adds a range of husbands’ observed characteristics (5-year age dummies, ethnicity, 
parental socio-economic group, parental level of education, private school attendance, and tertiary attainment). Standard errors in 
parentheses. Private school effect averaged over age-groups. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4b: Husbands’ labour market outcomes, BCS-70, age 42 
(1) (2) (3) 
(I) Log weekly earnings






N 2,028 2,028 2,028 
(II) Weekly earnings in 90% Decile. AME






N 2,028 2,028 2,028 







N 2,028 2,028 2,028
(IV) High Status Occupation. AME






N 2,509 2,509 2,509





Higher education (R) X 
Partner’s age, level of 
education (H)  
X 
Notes: Mean differences in spousal labour market outcomes by female private school attendance. (I) Effect on log weekly earnings. 
(II)/ (III) differences in the likelihood of spousal income in the 90th percentile/ below the median. Cut-points derived from BCS. (IV) 
female private school effects on likelihood to match with spouse in higher managerial and professional occupations (based on NS-
SEC groupings). Column (1) reports differences adjusted by demographic characteristics (ethnicity, region of residence). Column (2) 
adds controls for socio-economic background during childhood (social class at birth, parental educational attainment, housing 
tenure, persons per room ratio, number of days read to in reference week, free school meal receipt, family income band), 
information on early cognitive developments at age 5 and 10, and controls for mother’s age at birth, birth order, weight at birth and 
whether ever breast-fed). To address missingness, estimations based on multiple imputations. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented evidence that 
there is a substantive degree of school-type 
homogamy in Britain, whereby a privately educated 
woman, compared with a state-educated woman 
with otherwise similar social background, is 7 
percentage points more likely to marry a privately 
educated man. Our explanation is that homogamy 
by school-type partly reflects education-level 
homogamy, owing to the high quality of private 
schooling in Britain, but that it also follows directly 
from shared values and networks inculcated in 
private schools. We found that homogamy by 
school-type is especially strong among non-
graduates, and absent among graduates, testimony 
to the widening social environment associated with 
university life and beyond.  
We have also found that the husbands of 
privately educated women have an estimated 15% 
greater hourly pay using BHPS-UKHLS, and 20% 
greater weekly pay using age 42 BCS data, than the 
husbands of state-educated women. The husbands 
of the privately-educated were much more likely to 
work in high status occupations, more likely to be 
earning in the 90th percentile, and less likely to be 
earning below the median, than the husbands of 
the state educated.  
A number of limitations to the analysis should be 
noted. We have reasonable controls for social 
background and educational credentials, including 
especially good ones in the BCS data. However, 
some other factors that are unobserved, such as 
parental attitudes, could be positively related both 
to private school choice and the matching 
outcomes investigated. If so, any causal effect of 
private school attendance would be lower than our 
estimates of the conditional association suggest. 
Measurement error of school-type, on the other 
hand, might suggest an underestimate of its effects. 
Even though school-type when leaving school is 
accurately recorded in retrospect by the vast 
majority of cases, we do not have information on 
the length of time in private school, or on 
differences in private school quality. Finally, 
another issue is that surveys such as BHPS/UKHLS 
and BCS do not adequately track those going 
abroad. There are relatively few of these, but 
especially in recent years, when some elite schools 
have become the training ground for some high 
earners in a globally integrated world, trimming 
from the sample those who leave the country might 
alter the estimated association with private school 
attendance.10 
Nevertheless, the finding of strong relationships 
between females’ private schooling and their 
husbands’ earnings raises anew the issue of the 
negative association between private schooling and 
social mobility. This link is already implied by the 
labour market returns enjoyed by both men and 
women, and the exclusivity in access implied by the 
relatively high fees charged in most schools. The 
findings in this paper reinforce this link: school-type 
homogamy, and associated educational homogamy, 
combine to help retain economic and social 
advantages within the family. In asking whether 
private school girls marry rich, a natural extension 
of this line of research would be to examine the 
accumulated wealth of partners, and the 
consequent links with household income. Future 
research can also be extended to the marriage 
returns for males. One would expect to find similar 
effects in other countries or regions where private 
education is both sharply separated from the state 
in governance and funding, and associated with 
high earnings. Other sharp institutional dividing 
lines in education with potential implications for 
adult social and economic outcomes, such as 
between religious and secular schools, may also 
provide fruitful areas for research on homogamy 
linked to school type, though in such cases the 
school typology might reflect a different 
institutional dichotomy, more salient for different 
countries or contexts. 
Our findings also may have implications for 
school choice by parents, seemingly raising the 
returns to private education. One potential further 
extension to the analysis of school-type homogamy 
would be to allow for the prospective marriage 
market return to affect the choice of private 
education and, further, the level of investment. 
Chiappori, Iyiguin and Weiss (2009) developed a 
model of equilibrium education and marriage 
choice in the presence of educational homogamy 
underpinned by complementary preferences. In 
empirical work Ge (2011) and Lafortune (2013) each 
report effects of changing marriage prospects on 
college educational investments in the US. Yet the 
possibility that choice of school-type in Britain is 
also affected by marriage prospects is a further 
reason for caution in interpreting our findings as 
unbiased estimates of causal effects. 
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Endnotes 
1. The following citation from Mail Online, 12/2/2014, illustrates this point under the headline: “I spend a
fortune to send my girl to private school – so she’ll marry rich and never work”. The citation proceeds:
"my husband ... and I place great importance on her learning. Indeed, we hope she will go on to study at
Oxford University, ( ... which is...) the ideal place for her to find a husband with the right background and
career prospects to make enough money so Matilda can become a stay at-home mother." See also
"Private schools continue to divide 'them and us' Britain", The Week, 2/11/2011; "Kate Middleton's
family and the Upper Middleton", Evening Standard, 7/5/2015.
2. A new scheme to enable boarding education for disadvantaged students on the edge of the care system
has recently launched on a small scale; see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/more-help-for-
vulnerable-children-to-attend-top-boarding-schools
3. The source of the superior quality of private schooling in terms of educational outcomes is not fully
understood, but is held to lie in some combination of their superior resources, autonomous governance
and beneficial peer effects from privileged and supportive social background of the pupils. The resource
gap is especially large in Britain, with fees alone being of the order of three times the unit expenditure on
state school pupils.
4. https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/; https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/ Since the specific
question on private school attendance is not included in UKHLS, we are unable to incorporate its larger
sample.
5. These key indicators could be supplemented by other controls available in the data at various waves,
though typically there will be considerable multiple collinearity among the indicators.
6. Inevitably, recall data might be liable to some recall error. Nevertheless where multiple reports of
participation were available, the retrospective data proved to be reliable in the large majority of cases: in
fewer than 1% of cases did the age 42 recall data differ from the contemporary information sources
(Green et al., 2018).
7. Plewis, Calderwood, Hawkes and Nathan (2004) provide an analysis of all samples up to age 30.
8. Generating a similar pattern of conclusions we also tried an alternative approach, embedding the
decision in a multinomial model of marriage and husband’s school types, comparing for women the
option of remaining unmarried with heterogamous marriage or homogamous marriage. Menzel (2015)
shows that for large marriage markets the conditional choice problem can be approximated by a logit
model.
9. The findings for both these sensitivity analyses are available on request.
10. Overall, 2% of the BCS age 16 sample had ever emigrated by age 42, including 3% of those at private
secondary school.
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Appendix 
This appendix presents details of variable descriptions and tables of descriptive statistics of all variables from 
both data sets used in our analyses.  
Table A1 Variable descriptions 
Variable Description 
Demographics 
Age Categorical variable. Cutpoints differ between females and males 
to account for the persistent age difference in marriages  
• Respondents: 24–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54,
55–59.
• Partner: <27, 27–31, 32–36, 37–41, 42–46, 47–51, 52–56,
57–61, 62+
Ethnicity Binary indicator to distinguish between whites and non-white 
respondents (self-reported) 
Social Background 
Paternal education (at age 14) Categorical variable that distinguishes between 
- Neither parent had formal qualifications
- At least one parent with some qualifications/further
education quals
- At least one parent with a university/higher degree
- No valid data for either parent
Paternal socio-economic group class 
(at age 14) 
Categorical variable that groups parents into 5 classes based on the 
highest reported socio-economic group: 
- High: large managers, large employers, self-employed and
employed professionals
- Intermediate: small managers and intermediate level
supervisors, intermediate level non-manual workers
- Small employers: small employers and own account
workers (non-farm and farm)
- Services: junior non-manual, personal services, armed
forces
- Manual: foreman manual, (semi-)skilled and unskilled
manual and agricultural workers
- Unemployed/Inactive: neither parent in paid work
- Other/ missing: no information
Educational Attainment 
Educational attainment Categorical variable to distinguish between higher tertiary 
attainment and below: Higher tertiary (=1) or lower (=0) 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics, married women, BHPS/UKHLS 
mean sd 
Log monthly household income 8.223 0.603 
Not in work 0.269 0.444 
Private school 0.062 0.241 
Tertiary attainment 0.138 0.345 
24–29 0.081 0.273 
30–34 0.131 0.337 
35–39 0.157 0.364 
40–44 0.166 0.372 
45–49 0.160 0.367 
50–54 0.156 0.363 
55–59 0.148 0.355 
Non-white 0.037 0.188 
London 0.236 0.425 
Parental SEG 
Neither parent had formal qualifications 0.323 0.468 
some qualifications/ further education  0.426 0.494 
university/ higher degree 0.073 0.259 
Missing 0.179 0.383 
large managers, large employers, employed professionals 0.165 0.371 
small managers and intermediate level supervisors 0.125 0.331 
small employers and own account workers 0.131 0.337 
junior non-manual, personal services 0.175 0.380 
foreman manual, (semi-)skilled and unskilled manual 0.319 0.466 
neither parent in paid work 0.043 0.202 
no information 0.042 0.201 
Highest parental qualification 
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no formal qualifications 0.323 0.468 
some qualifications/ further education  0.426 0.494 
university/ higher degree 0.073 0.259 
Missing 0.179 0.383 
N 44035 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics, husbands, BHPS/UKHLS 
mean sd 
Log hourly wages 2.641 0.608 
Earnings in 9th decile 0.139 0.346 
Earnings below median 0.351 0.477 
SOC MG1/MG2 0.351 0.477 
Private school 0.060 0.238 
Higher education 0.179 0.383 
27–31 0.015 0.122 
32–36 0.084 0.277 
37–41 0.150 0.358 
42–46 0.178 0.382 
47–51 0.177 0.382 
52–56 0.161 0.368 
57–61 0.132 0.338 
62+ 0.103 0.304 
Non-white 0.035 0.183 
Parental SEG 
large managers, large employers, employed professionals 0.162 0.368 
small managers and intermediate level supervisors 0.125 0.331 
small employers and own account workers 0.124 0.330 
junior non-manual, personal services 0.171 0.377 
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foreman manual, (semi-)skilled and unskilled manual 0.330 0.470 
neither parent in paid work 0.037 0.188 
no information 0.051 0.221 
Highest parental qualification 
no formal qualifications 0.332 0.471 
some qualifications/ further education  0.428 0.495 
university/ higher degree 0.064 0.245 
Missing 0.175 0.380 
N 29347 
Table A4 Descriptive statistics for the married women in the British Cohort Study at age 42 
mean sd 
Annual household income >£55.9k  0.237 0.425 
Not in work 0.181 0.385 
Log Husband’s weekly pay 6.167 0.676 
Husband’s weekly pay in 9th decile 0.166 0.373 
Husband’s weekly pay below median 0.313 0.464 
Husband’s occupation MG1/ MG2 0.138 0.345 
Private school 0.069 0.253 
Higher education 0.333 0.622 
At Birth 
V unskilled 0.043 0.203 
IV partly-skilled 0.146 0.353 
III manual 0.431 0.495 
III non manual 0.152 0.359 
II managerial and Technical 0.162 0.368 
I professional 0.062 0.242 
 Other (not in work/ other) 0.003 0.056 
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Birthweight (in g) 0.055 0.229 
livebaby 1.989 1.197 
Mother’s age at birth 26.089 5.248 
Age 5 
Breast Feeding 0.407 0.491 
Housing tenure (own) 0.650 0.477 
Housing tenure (social rent) 0.255 0.436 
Housing tenure (private rent) 0.050 0.218 
Housing tenure (other) 0.045 0.207 
Persons per room 1.012 0.250 
English Picture Vocabulary Test [max 56) 35.600 10.044 
Schonell Reading Test 1.986 4.385 
Copying Designs Test 4.962 1.900 
Number of Days Read to in Last Week 4.709 2.484 
European UK 0.973 0.161 
European Other 0.008 0.091 
Other 0.018 0.134 
Age 10 
banded family income (1) 0.051 0.220 
banded family income (2) 0.264 0.441 
banded family income (3) 0.350 0.477 
banded family income (4) 0.185 0.388 
banded family income (5) 0.080 0.272 
banded family income (6) 0.070 0.255 
Free school meal recipient 0.117 0.321 
Friendly Maths Test 45.978 10.925 
Edinburgh Reading Test 44.008 11.239 
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BAS Word Definitions 10.517 4.842 
Age 42 
Number Of Children in HH 1.840 1.013 
North 0.060 0.238 
Yorks and Humberside 0.091 0.287 
East Midlands 0.072 0.259 
East Anglia 0.045 0.208 
South East 0.289 0.453 
South West 0.105 0.307 
West Midlands 0.089 0.284 
North West 0.107 0.309 
Wales 0.058 0.234 
Scotland 0.084 0.278 
Partner 
Age 44.244 4.558 
Age left ft-education (<18) 0.612 0.487 
Age left ft-education (18/19) 0.152 0.359 
Age left ft-education (20/21) 0.087 0.282 
Age left ft-education (22/29) 0.135 0.342 
Age left ft-education (30+) 0.013 0.115 
N 2529 
